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RECENT DECISIONS
construe the express conditions as covenants whose breach does not
work a forfeiture." In these situations where the right of re-entry is
reserved the breach must be substantial and not merely technical. 2
The breach of itself is not sufficient to divest title; there must be a
re-entry on the part of the grantor and his heirs.3 This right of
re-entry is merely a possibility and can neither be assigned, conveyed,
devised or mortgaged but accrues to the heirs as representatives of
the original grantor.4 If the person entitled to re-enter commences
an action in ejectment, forfeiture is accomplished and a conveyance is
necessary to restore title to the grantees.5 On the other hand, the
person having the right to re-enter may waive the breach and be
estopped from asserting any claim to the premises for that particular
breach.0 The statutes on expectant estates do not apply to possibili-
ties, 7 and as these possibilities were not alienable or devisable on
common law, their status remains the same.
8
M. E. M cC.
TAXATION-TAXING TO PROvIDE FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE-
CONSTITUTIONAL LA.-In 1933 the government, as part of its eco-
nomic emergency program, enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act.'
The essential features of the "A. A. A." made provision for stabiliza-
tion of prices on agricultural products through the medium of benefit
payments to farmers for curtailment of production. Appropriation
'Nichol v. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 12 N. Y. 121 (1854); Avery v. N. Y. C.
etc. Ry., 106 N. Y. 142, 12 N. E. 619 (1887); Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361,
22 N. E. 145 (1889) ; Graves v. Deterling, 120 N. Y. 447, 24 N. E. 655 (1890);
Cunningham v. Parker, 146 N. Y. 29, 40 N. E. 635 (1895).
'Riggs v. Purcell. 66 N. Y. 193 (1876); Woodsworth v. Payne, 74 N. Y.
176 (1878) ; Rose v. Hawley, 141 N. Y. 366, 36 N. E. 335 (1894).
'Nichol v. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 12 N. Y. 121 (1854); Plumb v. Tubbs,
41 N. Y. 442 (1869) ; Moore v. Pitts, 53 N. Y. 85 (1873) ; Conger v. Duryee.
90 N. Y. 594 (1881); Uppington v. Corrigan, 151 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359
(1896); Trustees, etc. v. City of N. Y.. 173 N. Y. 38. 65 N. E. 853 (1903).
'Nichol v. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 12 N. Y. 121 (1854); Uppington v. Corri-
gan, 151 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359 (1896).
'Ludlow v. N. Y. & Har. Ry., 12 Barb. 440 (N. Y. 1852); Conger v.
Duryee. 90 N. Y. 594 (1881).
6 Hunter v. Osterhandt, 11 Barb. 33 (N. Y. 1851) ; Ludlow v. N. Y. & Har.
Ry., 12 Barb. 440 (N. Y. 1852): Ireland v. Nichols, 46 N. Y. 413 (1871);
Conzer v. Duryee, 90 N. Y. 594 (1881) ; Miller v. Prescott, 163 Mass. 12, 39
N. E. 409 (1895).
'N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW (1909) § 35: Vail v. Lonz Island R. R., 106 N. Y.
2S3. 12 N. E. 607 (1887); Griffen v. Shepard, 124 N. Y. 70, 26 N. E. 339
(1891).
'Towle v. Remson. 70 N. Y. 312 (1877); Uppington v. Corrigan, 151
N. Y. 143. 45 N. E. 359 (1896).
148 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. 601 et seq. (1933).
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for the benefit payments was provided for within the Act in the form
of a tax levied on the first domestic processing of the commodity.
On argument before the United States Supreme Court, held, this
exercise of the taxing power was in conflict with the Federal Con-
stitution,2 in so far as it attempted through the imposition of a tax
to regulate activities solely confined to the sovereign jurisdiction of
the states. (Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo, JJ., dissenting.) United
States v. Butler et al., 296 U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1935).
The taxing power must be exercised for a public purpose.3
Revenue raised to aid in the production and marketing of farm
products is for a public purpose in so far as it affects the general
welfare of the citizens of the several states.4 This processing tax
is, however, unconstitutional though it does comply with a national
policy.5
The taxing power herein invoked is delegated specifically 6 to
the Federal Government to provide for the general welfare.7  But
it is limited in its scope. It may not tax with a purpose of regu-
lating intra-state activities, 8 nor coerce compliance with such regu-
latory statutes through penal taxation.9 Here it is maintained that
coercion was employed to affect regulation of farmers' activities,
though "If Congress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of tempting
them to yield, that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the
simple expedient of not yielding". 10 As pointed out by the dissenting
2U. S. CONST. Art. X.
'Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 655, 664 (1874) ; Hackett v. Ottawa, 99
U. S. 86, 94 (1878). A tax is to be expended in a manner which shall promote
the general prosperity and welfare of the municipality.
'Green et al. v. Frazier et al., 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1919). A
North Dakota statute levied a tax to raise revenue to aid the farmer. Carman
et al. v. Hickman County, 185 Ky. 630, 637, 215 S. W. 408, 413 (1919). "Its
ultimate purpose was plainly to develop the great agricultural interests of the
state and thus contribute to the welfare and wealth of the people."
'See Note (1936) 34 MicH. L. REv. 382 for a comprehensive discussion
of the A. A. A.
'Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(5th ed.) c. XIV.
'Hill, Jr. v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453 (1922). The Future
Trading Act was held unconstitutional as an undue regulation of a state activity
by means of a license tax.
'Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1922). So here
the so-called tax is a penalty to coerce the people of a state to act in respect
to a matter completely within the realm of the state government. Frost
Trucking Co. v. R. R. Comm. of California, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605(1926). It was a violation of due process to compel a private carrier to assume
the burdens of a public carrier as a condition precedent to the use of public
highways.
"O See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923) at
p. 482. Benefit payments were to be made to states that complied with federal
regulations on maternity. (Decided on jurisdiction.)
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opinion, "Threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of eco-
nomic coercion." 11
If a defect existed at all, it was created by combining the ap-
propriation clause with the taxing clause,'12 for incidental regulation
has been the aftermath (if not the purpose) of many a taxing
measure. Popular examples of this may be found in the oleomar-
garine 13 and drug 14 industries. Judicial emphasis in previous cases
has been placed on the distinctive fact that the power exercised has
always been within the constitutional purposes, while the regulatory
feature was merely incidental. 15 An excuse was found for "the
exceptional nature of the subject regulated" in the liquor regulation
statute 1-where no fear was apprehended that "such power may be
constitutionally extended to things which it may not, consistently
with the guarantees of the Constitution, embrace." Apparently, the
"A. A. A." Act was not of such "exceptional nature" for such fear
was apprehended. 17 If the processing tax could be given legal effect
when divorced 18 from the purpose clause, then a fortiori the only
regulation exercised was in appropriating for the general welfare,
and any limitation on this power "is contradictory and destructive
of the power to appropriate for the public welfare, and is incapable
of practical application." 19
I.D.
'See the instant case, Stone, J., dissenting, at 326.
'Hill, Jr. v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453 (1922). The purpose
was clear on its face. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, 16 Sup. Ct.
1120 (1869). Here a two-cents-per-pound bounty was to be given to every
producer of sugar who was licensed by the Comm. of Internal Revenue. Three
years later a general appropriation measure provided for the payment of this
bounty. The Court, without determining the constitutionality of the grant of
the bounty, held that the licensee was entitled to payment under the appropria-
tion bill.1 McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769 (1904).
"4United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214 (1919);
Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5, 45 Sup. Ct. 446 (1925) (limits the drug
act to a strict construction of a revenue measure) ; United States v. Daugherty,
269 U. S. 360, 46 Sup. Ct. 156 (1926) (questioned its constitutionality, at 362) ;
Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 48 Sup. Ct. 388 (1928) (reaffirmed its
constitutionality though admitting the regulation features)
'Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580. 5 Sup. Ct. 247 (1884). The tax
burden imposed is but a mere incident of the regulation of commerce. To like
effect-regulation of bank notes in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533 (1896) ;
regulation of tobacco in Felsenheld v. United States, 186 U. S. 126, 22 Sup. Ct.
740 (1902).
"' Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. R., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup.
Ct. 180 (1916).
U Instant case at 323, 324. Citing possibilities of extension if the Act was
declared constitutional.
" Instant case at 316. "The tax can only be sustained by ignoring the
avowed purpose and operation of the Act. and holding it a measure merely
laying an excise upon processors to raise revenue for the subject of the
government."
'6 Instant case at 327. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone.
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